Du sommaire: Ambiguite et comprehension du langage (Paul Bogaards, Johan Rooryck). - Why pluralities don't mean a thing (Crit Cremers). - Aspects of interlingual ambiguity: polyglot punning (Dirk Delabastita). - Les feux de Saint-Antoine (Sjef Houppermans). - The semantics of Dutch moeten 'must, should, have to' from a typological and a relevance-theoretical perspective (Theo Janssen). - L'ambiguite en langue et en discours (Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni).".

‘Incongruity is never superfluous’Thea Arbee (2016) Is the superfluous a (new) modality?11. Even if much has been written about ingredients that trigger laughter, researchers are still far from hav...

Le concept de nature est reconstruit en considérant le processus d'objectivation à l'oeuvre dans l'expérience systémique du scientifique, qui prend la forme d'une expérience d'immanence redoublée. Ce redoublement est ensuite analysé à l'intérieur des systèmes que le savant analyse par l'étude du passage d'un système physique auto-organisé du type transition de phase à un système biologique. [Electre 2015].

에서 선험적 규정은 의지와도 인식과도 관련되지 않는다. 그것은 판단 자체를 다룬다. 그것은 어떻게 무언가가 판단되어야 하는가를 확립한다. 미적 판단은 유쾌함과 불쾌함을 다룬다. 유쾌함은 단순한 감각이 아니라 감정이다. 미적 판단은 나의 본성과 관련되는 판단이지 오성이나 의지와 관련된 것이 전혀 아니다. 그것들은 나로부터 나오는 것이지 자연 자체로부터 나오는 것이 아니다. 그것들은 나로부터 나오지만 유비적인 것들이다. 나는 그것들을 구상하지만 이 일은 마치 나의 자연(본성)을 누군가가 구성하기라도 한 것처럼, 자연이 그것을 구상할 수 있었기라도 한 것처럼 일어난다. 그런 이유로 그 판단들은 반성적인 것이지 규정적인 것이 (...) 아니다. 이 글에서 나는 두 문제를 제기할 것이다. 하나는 단순한 반성으로서의 미적 판단이 어떻게 또한 규정적이고 선험적일 수 있는가? 다른 하나는 단순한 규정적 판단들이 문제가 되든, 아니면 반성적 판단들과 규정적 판단들 사이의 구분이 문제되든, ‘비판’이라는 말은 동일한 의미를 가지는가? 하는 것이다. 나는 과 사이에 칸트 철학의 구조적인 변화가 있다는 것을 보여줄 것이다. (shrink)

루소는 『에밀』에서 아이가 자신의 욕구를 자연스레 표현할 수 있는 감정교육. 즉 자연교육을 강조한다. 이것은 아이 자신을 위한 교육이자 인간교육이다. 그러나 『에밀』과 같은 해에 출판한 『사회계약론』에서는 일반의지에 복종하는 시민상을 그려준다. 일반의지는 개인적 욕구가 아니라 사회적 의무를 수행하는 시민의 덕목이다. 따라서 인간교육과 시민교육을 각각 강조하는 이 두 저서에는 얼핏 화해할 수 없는 지점이 있는 듯 하지만 두 책의 주장 사이에 비밀스런 조화가 있다. 바로 사회적 의무가 강압적인 것이 아니라 자발적인 것이 될 수 있기 위해 교육이 필요하다는 것이다. 그러므로 필자는 두 책을 연결하고 (...) 지도하는 핵심 이념을 『에밀』에서 찾는다. 『에밀』의 자연교육에서 가장 마지막의 과정이 정의의 자연적 감정을 체득하는 일이다. 정의는 외부에서 강제되는 것이 아니라 타인에 대한 배려와 사랑으로서 마음에 의해 느껴지는 데서 나온다. 교사는 이를 강요하지 않고 아이가 자연스러운 방식으로 스스로 체득하게 해야 한다. 루소는 이러한 자발성을 함양하는 교육이야말로 사회 내의 진정한 정치적 변화에 이르게 하는 길임을 역설한다. (shrink)

이 논문의 첫 번째 목적은 베르그손에서 깡길렘에 이르는 계보적 관계를 보여주는 것이다. 이들은 프랑스철학에서 전개되는 상당히 독특한 문제제기의 한 방식을 보여준다. 그것은 자신의 기초를 자신 안에서 찾을 수 없을지도 모르는 분야인 한에서 철학의 비정초적 특징이다. 철학의 모든 진리는 과학, 임상의학, 기술 등이 철학에 대해 가지는 시선에 의해 조건지어지고 한계지어진다. 우리의 두 번째 목적은 방법론적인 차원만이 아니라 존재론적인 차원에서 무엇보다도 깡길렘의 규범, 정상성, 규범성의 개념들을 분석하는 것이다. 이 개념들은 베르그손에게서 그러하듯이 생물학적 실재성에 대한 일정한 전제 위에서 생명을 연구하는 특별한 방식을 보여준다. (...) 물론 깡길렘의 합리주의적 생기론은 베르그손의 유심론적 생기론과는 다르다. 깡길렘은 일군의 생리적 상수들로 정의된 생명체로부터 시작한다. 그러나 이 결정론적 출발점은 생명을 설명하기에 충분하지 않다. 생명체는 베르그손이 이미 보여주었듯이 자신의 현재 상태를 넘어서는 역동성을 보여 준다. 그것이 환경과의 관계에서 무엇을 하는가 하는 것 역시 그것이 무엇인지에 대한 서술의 일부를 이룬다. 따라서 생명체는 그것이 무엇인가 그리고 그것이 무엇을 하는가 사이의 관계로 정의된다. 이 관계는 불일치의 관계이다. (shrink)

Qui peut repondre a la question: qu'est-ce que la vie? le biologiste? le geneticien? le naturaliste? l'epistemologue? Comment se reperer dans la jungle des reponses proposees par ces differents specialistes? Ce petit livre met l'accent sur trois points qui sont actuellement l'objet de debats tres vifs. Tout d'abord le cadre de la reponse est celui d'une epistemologie non physicaliste, qui refuse d'accepter la double these de la completude et de la cloture causale du monde physique, et renvoie dos a dos (...) les deux positions metaphysiques intenables du physicalisme et du vitalisme. Ensuite, la vie apparait liee a un systeme d'objets hetero-organise qui ne peut etre completement decrit par l'ensemble de ses contraintes internes, contrairement aux systemes physiques ordinaires. Voila pourquoi la vie n'est pas simplement la replication ou la reproduction, ni l'heredite genetique, mais est liee au metabolisme, a la compartimentation cellulaire, a la selection naturelle, etc. Enfin il faut parler d'un systeme d'agents plutot que d'un systeme d'objets, car un systeme biologique se caracterise par le fait que le temps agit sur lui. Pour cette raison il est difficile d'en degager des invariants internes, la description initiale que nous pouvons en donner n'est pas celle de son fonctionnement. C'est en ce sens que nous nous proposons de parler de proprietes emergentes. Qu'est-ce que la vie, alors? une disposition? une essence? une structure atemporelle? Ne faut-il pas reformuler la question et se demander: d'ou vient la vie? comment la vie evolue? (shrink)

Introduction 1) Une épistémologie non fondationnelle § 1. Concernant l?usage philosophique de l?adjectif « vital », on s?attend à voir surgir une distinction entre le vivant et le vécu, comme si d?emblée nous pouvions et devions accepter que le vital soit aussi quelque chose d?éprouvé par la conscience, par opposition au vivant qui serait simplement observé et expliqué par la science. Pourquoi, dès lors, faudrait-il rechercher dans ou chez les êtres vivants quelque chose de vital ? Cela ne reviendrait-il pas (...) à multiplier les entités et à transformer subrepticement le prédicat « vivant » en être ? Cela ne nous engagerait-t-il pas vers une substantialisation de la vie érigée ainsi en réalité métaphysique ? N?est-ce pas justement le défaut des vitalistes comme Bergson (1907) ou Driesch, de créer un tel processus de surdétermination (Mayr, 1961 ; Kim, 1993, 1998) par et à travers lequel, à un phénomène inconnu X devrait correspondre en même temps des causes observables X?, X?? et une force vitale inobservable Y ? Ce processus introduirait ainsi une entité supra­naturelle dans le cours des événements naturels et rendrait impossible toute forme de stabilité et de généralité pour la relation associant X à X?, X?? et X???. § 2. Nous allons pourtant partir d?une position épistémologique in­édite. Il n?est pas question pour nous d?imposer d?emblée aux biologistes l?existence. (shrink)

This essay focuses on two philosophical assumptions.According to the first one, biological normativity is not an irreducible property of the living, but rather the living is the historical result of its normative activity. There is therefore a logic of life at work in every living organism that makes it a subject and an agent. It is not the fact that it is already a subject that explains the presence of this logic. It is therefore not impossible to naturalise biological normativity, (...) even if this concept proposed by Georges Canguilhem makes us bifurcate from a world of facts to a world of values.According to the second, we need to extend Varela’s concept of operational closure in order to naturalise biological normativity. We propose a new way of writing it that takes into account the fact that architectural constraints (ϕ1ϕ2) are always at stake in a biological system. By such constraints, we can predict the presence of specific propulsive and repulsive devices in every organism, by which its organisation can be constantly rebuilt, and through which biological disruption can also be amplified. (shrink)

Cet article essaie de montrer la maničre dont la méthode bergsonienne fonctionne sur un problčme concret: comment est-il possible de mesurer les sensations? Bergson explique qu’une sensation n’est pas un objet psychologique, puisque ce qu’elle est dépend de ce qu’elle nous fait. Alors elle n’est pas seulement représentée. Elle est vécue. Toute mesure des sensations ajoute un sentiment nouveau ŕ ce qui est mesuré . Ce sentiment spécifique n’est lié qu’ŕ la durée. Le premier objectif est de montrer que ce (...) vieux problčme épistémologique est toujours attrayant. Nous ne savons pas exactement comment mesurer les sensations, ni par une mesure additive, ni par une mesure ordinale. Mais nous voulons expliquer aussi comment l’intuition métaphysique fonctionne dans le premier livre de Bergson. Elle ne passe pas en premier. Elle vient toujours aprčs l’examen d’un problčme scientifique spécifique, car l’idée philosophique émerge toujours d’une maničre indirecte. Il est impossible alors d’affirmer avec Bergson que la science ne pense pas. Il importe juste de noter que la science ne pense pas seule. Elle a besoin de l’action critique de la philosophie. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une reprise du livre publié chez Kimé en 2007 : Bergson ou l'imagination métaphysique. J'y introduis pourtant des changements assez importants. Il s'agit essentiellement de mettre en valeur le fait que Bergson n'est pas un simple philosophe de l'immanence. C'est un philosophe de l'immanence redoublée. Ce point apparaît clairement, explicitement à travers l'analogie entre la durée de la conscience et la durée de l'univers qu'il développe dans son ouvrage de 1907. Mais il trouve son origine dans le (...) premier chapitre de Matière et mémoire. C'est pour comprendre ce redoublement que se construit chez Bergson une nouvelle vision des relations entre la philosophie et la science. La connaissance n'est plus relative. Elle participe à l'absolu. Elle engage ontologiquement. Le donné n'est plus directement constitué, il faut pour que l'intuition philosophique le saisisse, qu'elle "chevauche l'intelligence". Enfin ce que ce redoublement engage, c'est une philosophie du devenir fondée sur la théorie des deux ordres. On ne commente souvent que l'aspect négatif de cette théorie : la critique de l'idée de néant. Là n'est pas pour nous le point le plus central. Cette théorie nous engage à ne plus penser l'absolu comme complet, intelligible, ou encore parfait. L'absolu, qu'il soit l'esprit, la vie ou la matière, est toujours défini par l'inachèvement, puisque ce qu'il n'est pas n'est jamais du rien. C'est un autre visage de lui-même. (shrink)

À la page 150 de Matière et Mémoire, Bergson dit déjà du « virtuel » qu’il serait vain de vouloir « chercher l’obscurité sous la lumière ». Il reprend et précise cette idée trente ans plus tard. Promenons « l’idée radicalement neuve » qui « capte plus ou moins une intuition », nous la verrons « elle, obscure, dissiper des obscurités ». Par elle, des problèmes jugés insolubles « vont se dissoudre ». Ainsi « intellectualisée », cette lanterne bergsonie...

Biologists and philosophers often use the language of determination in order to describe the nature of developmental phenomena. Accounts in terms of determination have often been reductionist. One common idea is that DNA is supposed to play a special explanatory role in developmental explanations, namely, that DNA is a developmental determinant. In this article we try to make sense of determination claims in developmental biology. Adopting a manipulationist approach, we shall first argue that the notion of developmental determinant is causal. (...) We suggest that two different theses concerning developmental determination can be articulated: determination of occurrence and structural determination. We shall argue that, while the first thesis is problematic, the second, opportunely qualified, is feasible. Finally, we shall argue that an analysis of biological causation in terms of determination cannot account for entangled dynamics. Characterising causal entanglement as a particular kind of interactive causation whereby difference-making causes ascribable to different levels of biological organisation influence a particular ontogenetic outcome, we shall, via two illustrative examples, diagnose some potential limits of a reductionist, molecular and intra-level understanding of biological causation. (shrink)

Nelson’s stochastic quantum mechanics provides an ideal arena to test how the Born rule is established from an initial probability distribution that is not identical to the square modulus of the wavefunction. Here, we investigate numerically this problem for three relevant cases: a double-slit interference setup, a harmonic oscillator, and a quantum particle in a uniform gravitational field. For all cases, Nelson’s stochastic trajectories are initially localized at a definite position, thereby violating the Born rule. For the double slit and (...) harmonic oscillator, typical quantum phenomena, such as interferences, always occur well after the establishment of the Born rule. In contrast, for the case of quantum particles free-falling in the gravity field of the Earth, an interference pattern is observed before the completion of the quantum relaxation. This finding may pave the way to experiments able to discriminate standard quantum mechanics, where the Born rule is always satisfied, from Nelson’s theory, for which an early subquantum dynamics may be present before full quantum relaxation has occurred. Although the mechanism through which a quantum particle might violate the Born rule remains unknown to date, we speculate that this may occur during fundamental processes, such as beta decay or particle-antiparticle pair production. (shrink)

Rationality at the Limits and the Limits of Rationality:The Question of the Integrity and Existence of the Human SpeciesThe purpose of this article is to address the question of our responsibility as human beings, by taking into consideration the intersection between ethics and science. I intend to prove that the issues raised by the existence and the integrity of the human species is a new and curious form of power founded on what I call “the principle of non-reciprocity” that unites (...) the humanity of today with the future generations. The question that I address is the following: how to act on the future of humanity so that this action can not be regarded as unfair? (shrink)

Este manifesto, escrito a quatro mãos no contexto de um colóquio sobre Bergson organizado no Japão, visa inicialmente responder a uma simples questão: que significa, hoje, trabalhar à maneira de Bergson? Não se trata de uma pergunta sobre a dedicação para com o corpus bergsoniano ou quanto a certos temas que o seu pensamento permite renovar a compreensão, mas sim sobre o método que ele próprio recomenda. Este método foi aplicado diligentemente por Bergson no curso de suas investigações, particularmente quanto (...) ao seu trato com as ciências positivas, tanto as da vida quanto às do universo material em sentido amplo. No que diz respeito à função da imaginação metafísica, este manifesto refaz os passos de Bergson quanto a um empirismo não especulativo e verdadeiramente contemporâneo à inteligência científica. (shrink)

Rather than a return to Bergson, the ‘Kyoto manifesto’ argues for a renewed, expanded Bergsonism: a philosophical inquiry that lives up to the methodological standards set by Bergson, even if this implies prolonging some of his intuitions in different directions—possibly against himself. Several aspects of this endeavour are examined in turn: the meaning of ‘intuition’ and the prospects of speculative empiricism, the ontological scope of scientific theories, emergentism and the virtual, the relevance of space-time for duration, the place of metaphysical (...) imagination and its capacity to probe the utopian potential of a truly open science. (shrink)

Faire de la biologie et penser la biologie constituent deux activités indispensables l'une à l'autre. L'exemple de la " métaphore du programme génétique " nous montre, qu'entre l'explication atomique des physiciens et l'explication vitaliste, il peut y avoir un niveau moléculaire spécifique d'analyse des propriétés du vivant. Cet ouvrage a pour double ambition de montrer comment cette métaphore s'est constituée et quels en sont les éléments discutables. Il se propose d'analyser le processus à travers lequel elle est passée historiquement de (...) l'état de concept dynamique et opératoire à celui d'une image figée de plus en plus décalée de la réalité de la connaissance biologique. (shrink)

In this paper we present an interdisciplinary approach that concerns the problem of argument acceptance in an agronomy setting. We propose a computational cognitive model for argument acceptance based on the dual model system in cognitive psychology. We apply it in an agronomy setting within a French national project on durum wheat.

Advancing the reductionist conviction that biology must be in agreement with the assumptions of reductive physicalism (the upward hierarchy of causal powers, the upward fixing of facts concerning biological levels) A. Rosenberg argues that downward causation is ontologically incoherent and that it comes into play only when we are ignorant of the details of biological phenomena. Moreover, in his view, a careful look at relevant details of biological explanations will reveal the basic molecular level that characterizes biological systems, defined by (...) wholly physical properties, e.g., geometrical structures of molecular aggregates (cells). In response, we argue that contrary to his expectations one cannot infer reductionist assumptions even from detailed biological explanations that invoke the molecular level, as interlevel causal reciprocity is essential to these explanations. Recent very detailed explanations that concern the structure and function of chromatin—the intricacies of supposedly basic molecular level—demonstrate this. They show that what seem to be basic physical parameters extend into a more general biological context, thus rendering elusive the concepts of the basic level and causal hierarchy postulated by the reductionists. In fact, relevant phenomena are defined across levels by entangled, extended parameters. Nor can the biological context be explained away by basic physical parameters defining molecular level shaped by evolution as a physical process. Reductionists claim otherwise only because they overlook the evolutionary significance of initial conditions best defined in terms of extended biological parameters. Perhaps the reductionist assumptions (as well as assumptions that postulate any particular levels as causally fundamental) cannot be inferred from biological explanations because biology aims at manipulating organisms rather than producing explanations that meet the coherence requirements of general ontological models. Or possibly the assumptions of an ontology not based on the concept of causal powers stratified across levels can be inferred from biological explanations. The incoherence of downward causation is inevitable, given reductionist assumptions, but an ontological alternative might avoid this. We outline desiderata for the treatment of levels and properties that realize interlevel causation in such an ontology. (shrink)

Based on multiDEVS formalism, we introduce multiPDEVS, a parallel and nonmodular formalism for discrete event system specification. This formalism provides combined advantages of PDEVS and multiDEVS approaches, such as excellent simulation capabilities for simultaneously scheduled events and components able to influence each other using exclusively their state transitions. We next show the soundness of the formalism by giving a construction showing that any multiPDEVS model is equivalent to a PDEVS atomic model. We then present the simulation procedure associated, usually called (...) abstract simulator. As a well-adapted formalism to express cellular automata, we finally propose to compare an implementation of multiPDEVS formalism with a more classical Cell-DEVS implementation through a fire spread application. (shrink)

Symmetry-based explanations using symmetry breaking as the key explanatory tool have complemented and replaced traditional causal explanations in various domains of physics. The process of spontaneous SB is now a mainstay of contemporary explanatory accounts of large chunks of condensed-matter physics, quantum field theory, nonlinear dynamics, cosmology, and other disciplines. A wide range of empirical research into various phenomena related to symmetries and SB across biological scales has accumulated as well. Led by these results, we identify and explain some common (...) features of the emergence, propagation, and cascading of SB-induced layers across the biosphere. These features are predicated on the thermodynamic openness and intrinsic functional incompleteness of the systems at stake and have not been systematically analyzed from a general philosophical and methodological perspective. We also consider possible continuity of SB across the physical and biological world and discuss the connection between Darwinism and SB-based analysis of the biosphere and its history. (shrink)

Sleep is mandatory in most animals that have the nervous system and is universally observed in model organisms ranging from the nematodes, zebrafish, to mammals. However, it is unclear whether different sleep states fulfill common functions and are driven by shared mechanisms in these different animal species. Mammals and birds exhibit two obviously distinct states of sleep, i.e., non-rapid eye movement sleep and rapid eye movement sleep, but it is unknown why sleep should be so segregated. Studying sleep in other (...) animal models might give us clues that help solve this puzzle. Recent studies suggest that REM sleep, or ancestral forms of REM sleep might be found in non-mammalian or -avian species such as reptiles. These observations suggest that REM sleep and NREM sleep evolved earlier than previously thought. In this review, we discuss the evolutionary origin of the distinct REM/NREM sleep states to gain insight into the mechanistic and functional reason for these two different types of sleep. (shrink)

This article is about a period of technology transfer – the late 1910s and 1920s – when wartime aerial reconnaissance techniques and operations were being adapted to a range of civilian uses, including urban planning, land use analysis, traffic control, tax equalization, and even archaeology. At the center of the discussion is the ‘photomosaic’: a patchwork of overlapping aerial photographs that have been rectified and fit together so as to form a continuous survey of a territory. Initially developed during the (...) First World War to provide coverage of fronts, photomosaic mapping was widely practiced and celebrated during the postwar years as an aid to urban development. The article traces both the refinements in photomosaic technology after the Armistice and the rhetorical means by which the form’s avant-garde wartime reputation was domesticated into an ‘applied realism’ that often effaced its site-specific perspective, its elaborately rectified optics, and the oppositionality of both its military and civilian uses. The article has a broader theoretical aim as well. Classic statements of both structuralist and post-structuralist spatial theory (Barthes and de Certeau are the primary examples here) have produced an ossified geometry wherein the vertical is the axis of paradigm, top-down strategy, and manipulative distance and the horizontal the axis of syntagm, grassroots tactics, and resistant proximities and differences. In its close study of the technology and rhetoric surrounding interwar photogrammetry, the article provides an example of how one might reverse the long-standing misrecognition of high-altitude optics as effacing time, difference, and materiality – and what it might mean to view such optics as, instead, a resource in turning from abstract toward differential conceptions of both aerial photography and our theoretical habits. This turn I call ‘applied modernism’, a term that accesses both the wartime photomosaic’s affiliation with avant-garde painting and its insistence that portraits of the total are always projections from partial, specific vantages. (shrink)

L’histoire économique nous enseigne que si le progrès technique ne profite pas à tous les travailleurs lorsqu’il apparaît, à long terme il est le facteur principal de la hausse extraordinaire des salaires et du niveau de vie que l’économie mondiale a connue depuis la révolution industrielle. Pourtant, les progrès de la robotique pourraient bien remettre en question cet optimisme et donner raison aux Cassandre qui prophétisaient la fin du travail. En effet, le champ de ces technologies ne cesse de progresser, (...) au point où la totalité des tâches effectuées par les humains serait robotisable. Si c’est le cas, l’économie et la société en seraient profondément transformées. On considère six scénarios. Dans trois d’entre eux, une classe humaine quasi-oisive se maintient grâce à des transferts prélevés sur la production effectuée par les robots. Ces transferts peuvent s’effectuer à travers l’État-Providence, le clientélisme d’une oligarchie possédant les robots, ou le maintien néo-fordiste d’emplois tertiaires dont la fonction essentielle serait le versement d’un salaire qui permettrait le maintien du pouvoir d’achat. En l’absence de mécanismes redistributifs, on envisage trois autres scénarios. Selon le scénario des rentiers, une classe de propriétaires de robots émerge, suffisamment nombreuse pour s'opposer politiquement à des transferts redistributifs. Selon le scénario malthusien, le salaire tombe au niveau du salaire de subsistance et la population humaine diminue, ne laissant subsister qu’une classe de rentiers vivant de la possession de robots. Selon le scénario virtuel, le salaire de subsistance lui-même baisse considérablement sous l’effet des nouvelles technologies : la population se maintient en dépit des baisses de salaire. (shrink)

To fulfill their crucial duty of relieving suffering in their patients, physicians may have to administer palliative sedation when they implement treatment-limitation decisions such as the withdrawal of life-supporting interventions in patients with poor prognosis chronic severe brain injury. The issue of palliative sedation deserves particular attention in adults with serious brain injuries and in neonates with severe and irreversible brain lesions, who are unable to express pain or to state their wishes. In France, treatment limitation decisions for these patients (...) are left to the physicians. Treatment-limitation decisions are made collegially, based on the presence of irreversible brain lesions responsible for chronic severe disorders of consciousness. Before these decisions are implemented, they are communicated to the relatives. Because the presence and severity of pain cannot be assessed in these patients, palliative analgesia and/or sedation should be administered. However, palliative sedation is a complex strategy that requires safeguards to prevent a drift toward hastening death or performing covert euthanasia. In addition to the law on patients' rights at the end of life passed in France on April 22, 2005, a recent revision of Article 37 of the French code of medical ethics both acknowledges that treatment-limitation decisions and palliative sedation may be required in patients with severe brain injuries and provides legal and ethical safeguards against a shift towards euthanasia. This legislation may hold value as a model for other countries where euthanasia is illegal and for countries such as Belgium and Netherlands where euthanasia is legal but not allowed in patients incapable of asking for euthanasia but in whom a treatment limitation decision has been made. (shrink)

This book looks at why labour market institutions such as those evident in continental Europe - more specifically, employment protection, unemployment benefits, and relative wage rigidities - exist, what role they play in society, why they seem so persistent, where the pressure to reform them comes from, and whether reform can be politically viable or not. It studies the economic conditions under which we expect a given set of institutions to arise and remain stable, and provides theoretical guidelines about the (...) gainers and losers from given institutions. (shrink)